Code execution: sandboxes¶
Maps to: Code execution: sandboxes.
Scope¶
Isolated environments for arbitrary shell or code execution initiated by the agent, with clear boundaries for filesystem, network, and secrets.
Design questions¶
- When is
executeexposed versus filesystem-only tools? - Provider selection, warm pools, and lifecycle (per thread, per assistant, per run).
- Credential proxy versus secrets inside the sandbox.
- Prompt-injection threat model: host protected versus data inside sandbox compromised.
Tradeoffs¶
- Sandboxes unlock general-purpose agents but expand attack surface and cost.
- Warm pools reduce latency at steady-state expense.
- Disabling execute simplifies security but caps agent reach.
Evaluation hooks¶
- Host filesystem and env vars unreachable from sandbox breakout attempts in test harness.
- Outbound API calls receive credentials only via approved proxy path.
- Runaway command killed under CPU and time limits.
Reference notes¶
See LangChain runtime article (sandbox auth proxy figure).